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Abstract: 
This essay examines Ricœur’s mimetic and transfigurative perspective on non-objective art and adopts it as 
an idiom for examining Mark Rothko’s artistic intention in the multiform canvases of his “classical” period 
from 1949 until his death in 1970. Rothko unequivocally denied being an abstractionist, a colorist, or a 
formalist, insisting, on the contrary, that he desired to communicate discrete dimensions of experience and 
emotions to his viewers, specifically, experiences of the sacred and the spiritual. His large canvases, with 
their blurred edges, force the spectator into an intimacy of experience that opens the potentiality of 
heterogeneous interpretations. In other words, one might consider his paintings to be metaphors of dense 
meanings that imitate reality, not through facile representation, but through a Kierkegaardian repetition of 
worlds that track Ricœur’s own ideas of prefiguration, configuration, and re-figuration. I contend in this 
essay that Rothko’s “abstract expressionism” adequately illustrates Ricœur’s contention that non-figurative 
art succeeds far better than representational art in refiguring new worlds of meaning. 
Keywords: Metaphor, Mimesis, Abstract Art, Mystery. 
Résumé: 
Cet essai examine la perspective mimétique et transfigurative de Ricœur concernant l’art non objectif et 
l’adopte comme un idiome pour examiner l’intention artistique de Mark Rothko dans les toiles multiformes 
de sa période “classique” de 1949 jusqu'à sa mort en 1970. Rothko a nié catégoriquement être un peintre 
abstrait, un coloriste ou un formaliste, insistant, au contraire sur le fait qu'il voulait communiquer des 
dimensions distinctes de l'expérience et des émotions à ses spectateurs, en particulier, les expériences du 
sacré et du spirituel. Ses grandes toiles, avec leurs contours flous, forcent le spectateur à entrer dans une 
intimité d’expérience qui ouvre la possibilité d’interprétations hétérogènes. En d’autres termes, on pourrait 
considérer ses tableaux comme des métaphores de significations denses qui imitent la réalité, non pas à 
travers une représentation facile, mais à travers une répétition kierkegaardienne de mondes qui suivent les 
notions ricœuriennes de préfiguration, de configuration et de re-figuration. Je soutiens dans cet essai que 
“l’expressionnisme abstrait” de Rothko illustre adéquatement l’affirmation de Ricœur selon laquelle l’art 
non figuratif réussit bien mieux que l’art représentatif à refigurer de nouveaux mondes de sens. 
Mots-clés: Métaphore, mimesis, art abstrait, mystère. 
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Domenico Jervolino contends that one could map the itinerary of Paul Ricœur’s 
“hermeneutic journey” as a three-stage development from symbol through text to translation. 
Although he admits that the third paradigm is “less explicit than the first two,” he, nevertheless, 
insists that the idea of translation remains “secretly at work as a sort of third stage in Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics.” Indeed, he considers translation to be the “exemplary value” that characterizes 
Ricœur’s last philosophical phase, specifically because it overtly addresses the significance of 
human diversity and plurality with reference to languages, religions, beliefs, and cultures, along 
with the accompanying concerns of ethics and justice that such human dissimilarities evoke.1 
Furthermore, he contends that the concept of translation also expresses Ricœur’s commitment to 
linguistic humility, that is, to the affirmation that language can never boast of articulating an 
exhaustive explanation of existence. In other words, one might say that what Ricœur intended 
over four decades ago in his bifurcation between a “philosophy of absolute knowledge and the 
hermeneutics of testimony” may well, a decade ago, have been intralinguistically translated into 
the idea of the untranslatable.2 Jervolino notes that the issue of translation always communicates 
the tension between “an incessant work of translation” and the ubiquity of the untranslatable.3 
He claims, therefore, that one should not be surprised that Ricœur concludes Memory, History, 
Forgetting with the word “Inachevement,” “Incompletion,” nor that Ricœur “distinguishes his 
hermeneutics from Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ [by emphasizing] the ‘receding of horizons’.”4 
Eileen Brennan certainly appears to confirm Jervolino’s conclusions when she maintains 
that Ricœur identifies two valid access points for prosecuting the problem of translation: (1) “the 
test of the foreign” and (2) “language’s work on itself.”5 She insists that, although he inclines 
primarily toward the former, Ricœur, nevertheless, appreciates the provocative implications of 
the latter, especially as it relates to the systemic linguistic inevitability of the enigmatic or the 
non-communicative. The compulsion to affirm the potentiality of “secret” or “mystery” in 
discourse induces Ricœur to distance himself from his preferred practical polarity of 
“faithfulness/betrayal” in translation theory and return to the more theoretical binary of 
“translatable/untranslatable,” as, for example, when translating Paul Celan’s poetry.6 In other 
words, one cannot dismiss tout court either that no equivalence may be found among languages 
for every attempt at “saying” or that there may not be an ineffable “said” that no language can 
possibly signify. For Brennan, the above disjunction vis-à-vis the difficulty of translation implies 
that in every context, the wager of translation cannot avoid scuffling with the apophatic 
implications of the enigmatic limits to and limits of communication. 
Both Jervolino and Brennan directly relate Ricœur’s philosophy of translation and the 
ancillary inevitability of the ineffable to both the interlingual and intralingual types of translation. 
Of course, anyone familiar with translation studies should recognize these two distinctions as 
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deriving from Roman Jakobson’s threefold taxonomy of translation typology: interlingual, 
intralingual, and intersemiotic, which he also terms transmutation.7 These references to Jacobson 
broach a fascinating prospect for developing protean perspectives on prosecuting the enigmatic 
and ambiguous qualities of human existence. Attempts to comprehend the potential mystery that 
persistently characterizes human being-in-the-world may include non-linguistic forms of 
expression; however, they cannot avoid semiotics, since without signs there can be no 
intentionality or interpretation. Consequently, the translation of the meaningfulness of certain 
human experiences of transcendence or absence often eclipse the purely logical or quantifiable 
and appropriate various non-linguistic media. In other words – a good intralingual translational 
phrase (!) – does one go about figuring out the existential implications of the apophatic secrets of 
life, secrets that never fully escape the non-figural, only through the figurative languages of 
philosophers, theologians, or poets? If so, then one necessarily narrows one’s focus only to 
figures of speech in order to configure functional interpretations of ambiguity. On the other hand, 
could one not also find a way of figuring the non-figural through non-linguistic artistic media, 
such as music and painting? If so, then one expands the translational possibilities available to the 
prosecution of “incompletion” and “receding horizons,” thereby establishing a possible 
rapprochement between discursive and non-discursive means for comprehending and 
communicating the polysemic perplexities of human experience. Yet, such a rapprochement 
necessarily evokes the possibility of intersemiotic translation, a translation, or transmutation, into 
an alternative non-verbal semiotic system.  
Ricœur, himself, would not find such an intersemiotic translation invalid. He clearly 
admits that a basic “mark of language” is the fundamental “lack” that words cannot fulfill. This 
systemic vulnerability of language provokes Ricœur to adopt the polarity, referenced by Brennan 
above, of “faithfulness/betrayal” with reference to translation, since he contends that the 
translator must remain faithful to language’s “capacity for safeguarding the secret contrary to its 
proclivity to betray it.”8 In point of fact, Ricœur declares that “language’s struggle with the secret, 
the hidden, the mystery, the inexpressible is above all else the most entrenched incommunicable, 
initial untranslatable.”9 He testifies, however, that art also struggles with this “lack,” with what 
may be called “the ineffable, the formless, which is only partially exhausted by the forms.”10 
Additionally, he attests that the “ineffable has a character of incohesiveness, of a lack of 
differentiation, which is precisely surmounted by the work of art.” The work of art, in other 
words, offers an alternative structure to that of language, an expressing otherwise that may offer 
an alternative naming of the inexhaustibly unnamable mystery that provokes all saying.11 Strictly 
speaking, “[s]omething demands to be figured, composed, structured,” and one may attempt to 
name that something by translating it metamorphically into the work of art itself.12 This 
metamorphic, or transmutational, translation is, indeed, an intersemiotic translation. 
Negotiating an Abstract Intersemiosis of the Non-Figural 
I briefly broach the issues of the ineffable and of intersemiotic translation precisely 
because my own experiences of reflecting on the flux of existence, on the uncertainties of 
inventing/discovering meaning, and on the invigorating risks of being human have been 
profoundly affected philosophically by Paul Ricœur and aesthetically by Mark Rothko. 
Constantly seeking a rapprochement between these two diverse interpreters of reality, I find 
 Blurring the Edges 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 7, No 2 (2016)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2016.353    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
96 
 
myself perpetually negotiating between the discursive creativity of Ricœur’s philosophical 
hermeneutics and the aesthetic creativity of Rothko’s expressionistic art, tenaciously hoping to 
find a strategy whereby one might catch a glimpse of something more below the reflective 
surface of the natural attitude. Jacques Derrida punctuates the etymological denotation of 
“negotiation” as “un-leisure,” as the productive dissatisfaction between two theories or theorists 
that disallows one from ever coming to rest in the stasis of some stationary definable position. It 
remains kinetic, a “shuttling” reciprocally between alternative interpretations, which means “no 
thesis, no position, no theme, no station, no substance, no stability, a perpetual suspension, a 
suspension without rest.”13  
In my restless commute between Ricœur and Rothko, however, I conclude that, 
notwithstanding the non-thetic and non-thematic essence of negotiation, one may well establish a 
certain “thesis” or “theme” concerning an intersemiotic translation of how one might re-figure 
the un-figurable linguistically through figures of speech and visually through abstract figures of 
color and form. This essay, therefore, is one such shuttle mission of negotiating between Ricœur 
and Rothko in order, perhaps, to distinguish another way of saying and seeing the ineffable and 
the invisible, of noting yet again the polysemy and ambiguity of the human condition.  
Of course, I recognize that Paul Ricœur typically avoids giving extensive attention to 
interpreting the plastic arts or developing an aesthetic theory of the visual. He concentrates his 
hermeneutics almost exclusively in the areas of language and action, prosecuting various topics, 
such as self-knowledge, imagination, religion, justice, forgiveness, ethics, and translation – just to 
name a few – by limiting his examinations to the semantics of discourse theory and the 
pragmatics of human capability. The glaring “elephant in the room” that discloses its presence by 
its very absence is the compelling contributions that the arts, particularly the visual arts, make to 
comprehending the specific issues that Ricœur considers to be so essential for philosophical 
investigation. Certainly, there are notable exceptions to that lacuna. For example, as will be 
referenced below, he does address the visual arts in Interpretation Theory and “The Function of 
Fiction in Shaping Reality”; however, the primary motivation for a Ricœur/Rothko intersemiosis 
emerges from the final chapter on aesthetic experience in Critique & Conviction, where he 
responds overtly to the inquiry as to why art is “singularly lacking” in his work. Although he 
does not name Rothko in that response, he does specifically mention several abstract artists and 
identifies the existential and hermeneutical significance of that genre of painting.  
Correlatively, Mark Rothko might be suspicious of any attempt at an intersemiotic 
translation between the verbal and the visual. He has a decidedly ambivalent attitude toward any 
ekphrastic attempt to confine the meaning of a painting within the conceptual constraints of a 
linguistic commentary. He was a visual artist, one who trafficked in colors, shapes, and textures, 
not a poet or a playwright who created with words and phonemes. Indeed, he insists that a 
communicative chorismos so categorically separates artistic and verbal expressions that one idiom 
cannot be translated into the other; to do so, in Ricœur’s words, would be a betrayal of the 
integrity of both the artist and the art. He states with little ambiguity that one could never 
“duplicate the sense of a picture by the sense of words or sounds […] [or] translate [emphasis 
added] the truth of words by means of pictorial delineations.”14 Ironically, however, we only 
know of Rothko’s rupturing of the visual and the verbal because we can read his opinions in a 
posthumously-published manuscript that he wrote! In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Plato’s 
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performative contradiction with reference to writing as a pharmakon, Rothko obviously cannot 
remain silent regarding his artistic vouloir dire. Granted, he rarely, if ever, comments on the 
meaning of individual canvases; however, he never ceases communicating, either orally or 
textually, what he intended to accomplish in the lives of those who encounter his paintings. 
Although he basically stopped publishing his thoughts after 1950, he still continued afterwards to 
write letters and give interviews through which he passionately argues a quite specific 
philosophy of art, one influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, by mythology and metaphysics, 
and by the sacred and the mystical.15 
Given the above openings to the possibility of a Ricœur/Rothko intersemiosis, I do not 
feel uneasy at attempting such an intertextual reading of their respective approaches to figuring 
the non-figural. I propose, therefore, to compare the artistic intention of Mark Rothko expressed 
in the canvases of his “classical” period from 1949 until his death in 1970 to Ricœur’s mimetic and 
refigurative perspectives on non-objective art. I will particularly focus on the referential 
implications of Ricœur’s theories of metaphor and fiction as they relate to creating and describing 
reality. In other words, I shall seek to confirm that Rothko’s “abstract expressionism” adequately 
illustrates Ricœur’s contention that non-figurative art succeeds far better than representational art 
in refiguring new worlds of meaning.  
Reiterating Transcendence 
Notwithstanding his reluctance to translate the pictorial into the propositional, Mark 
Rothko does classify both non-verbal and verbal forms as “languages.” He asserts that painting 
functions analogously to singing or speaking as “a method of making a visible record of our 
experience, visual or imaginative, colored by our own feelings and reactions […].”16 As a result, 
successful paintings, that is, meaningful paintings, can never be isolated from existential 
circumstances.17 They are always contextualized within the structures of a community; 
consequently, art exists as a “form of social action,” specifically, a form of interpersonal 
communication.18 The artist intends to transmit through the work some particular subject matter, 
a subject matter that reveals something of the artist’s personal interpretation of reality. For 
precisely this reason, Rothko contends that the poet and the philosopher contribute the primary 
languages for interpreting the existential implications of art, since both address “the verities of 
time and space, life and death, and the heights of exaltation as well as the depths of despair” and, 
in doing so, create “the community of objectives in which the artist participates.”19 
As with his attitude toward commentary, so, too, here with reference to the 
communicative dynamic of art, Rothko takes something of a contradictory position. He claims 
that human beings have a biological need for self-expression and that art supplies a means for 
satisfying that need.20 Obviously, one could conclude that art as self-expression requires no 
spectator to engage the work and offers no constative testimony about the world. On the 
contrary, however, Rothko also writes that he has “never thought that painting a picture has 
anything to do with self-expression. It is a communication about the world to someone else.”21 
Perhaps the key to mitigating this apparent contradiction is to recognize that the issue of artistic 
self-expression does not become problematic for Rothko unless one sets it in opposition to any 
sense of referentiality. Painting cannot be merely the plastic analogue of an individual’s 
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emotional perspective articulated as some visual interjection. Instead, he requires that paintings 
be somewhat “semantic” in Ricœur’s sense of discourse, that is, that a canvas communicate 
“something about something.”22 In other words, rejecting any adherence to a traditional l’art pour 
l’art mentality, Rothko asserts that any painting should be generalized as a “representation of the 
artist’s notion of reality”; consequently, even a non-representational painting retains a referential 
function toward the world. 23  
Remaining consistent with his beliefs that art should communicate reality, Rothko 
adamantly refuses to reduce his paintings to strictly formalistic categories. He declares that a 
painting “is not its color, its form, or its anecdote, but an intent entity idea, where implications 
transcend any of these parts.”24 As a matter of fact, he confesses that he typically does not enjoy 
talking with other painters, precisely because they tend only to emphasize “design, color, etc. Not 
pure human reactions.”25 He goes so far as to reject being classified along with the other 
“Irrascibles” as an Abstract Expressionist.26 In lieu of considering himself an abstractionist, a 
colorist, or a formalist, he prefers to bear the label “anti-expressionist.” In a 1956 interview with 
Selden Rodman, Rothko does use the verb “expression” but only as a synonym for 
“communication.” He asserts that he only wants to communicate human emotions in such a 
manner that those who view his canvases will actually experience the same reality in viewing the 
paintings as he did in creating them. He notes that “people who weep before my pictures are 
having the same religious experience I had when I painted them.”27 For him, such an experience 
is not exclusively narcissistic, since it references a reality that transcends the singular individual. 
As a result, it is a reality that can be shared in a genuinely objective fashion and that can 
transform both the individual and the community. He concludes, therefore, that in accomplishing 
this aesthetic realism, art should never avoid truth or morality.28 Indeed, Rothko explains his 
move toward abstractionism as a significant attempt to realize the truth of human experience as a 
transformative adequation to reality. He argues that he constantly adheres “to the material reality 
of the world and the substance of these things. I merely enlarge the extent of this reality […] [and] 
insist upon the equal existence of the world engendered in the mind and the world engendered 
by God outside it.”29 
Eventually, Rothko’s preferred method for “enlarging the extent of reality” is 
transformed into a non-figural communication centered in the limited vocabulary of color and 
shape. He replaces the hard distinctions established by definitive lines with multiple layers of 
colors in different intensities and combinations bleeding into each other through blurred edges 
that never establish clean transitions. The edges appear kinetic as if they are vibrating, always 
dissatisfied with any identifiable stasis that appeals to the fovial vision of the spectator. In a 
manner similar to Hans Hoffman’s “push-pull” color dynamic of surface and depth, Rothko’s 
rectangles of various chroma recede and advance, simultaneously or serially attracting and 
repelling the individual examining the canvas, leaving her with the uneasiness of an uncertainty 
as to what exactly she is viewing. Only in such an “abstract” peristaltic manner does Rothko 
believe that he can evoke a person’s emotional, as well as rational, response, a response that 
intimates hidden dimensions of experience asymptotically revealing themselves through the 
polysemy of conflicting interpretations.  
All of the above characteristics of Rothko’s figuring the non-figural may be noted in one 
of the canvases that mark the transition between his “multi-form” paintings and the familiar 
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rectangles that define his classical period. In Untitled, 1949 (http://www.mark-
rothko.org/untitled-1949.jsp), one quite easily recognizes the blurring of edges that preempts his 
shapes from establishing themselves decidedly in some absolute definitive space. Colors and 
shapes fuse in such a manner as to leave the spectator in a certain state of mystery, almost an 
uncanniness that is not so much disorienting as vocative and provocative. The canvas seems to 
call or beckon the viewer to enter its un/defined environment in order to empower a receptivity 
for revelation. Immediately one is struck by the tension between the translucent light of the 
various yellows composing the perimeter and the deep opacity of the ebony void that forms the 
chasm separating the purple above and the green below. Yet, none of these colors is 
homogeneous, merely a singularized expression of a pure monochrome. On the contrary, a 
longer and more careful examination of the painting reveals multiple dimensions of color, a 
lamination of varied hues of the same chroma or actually an amalgamation of different pigments, 
such as the ochre color that peeps through the bottom green suggesting an esoteric depth that 
cannot be comprehended.  
Furthermore, one can note the “push-pull” impulse that animates the canvas. At times 
the dark void appears to advance toward the spectator, threatening to vacate the canvas and join 
the external reality. At other times, it recedes into its own negative space and, in doing so, 
seduces the viewer to enter the abyss without ever revealing whether it is an abyss of something 
insidious or of something so glorious as to remain undefined. That tension finds enhancement in 
the razor thin striation of white that peeks out from over the raw umber strip above the red 
separating the yellow from its purple complement. That almost insignificant edge of white 
suggests that something lies behind the “non-black” black, something lighter and enlightening, 
something waiting to be revealed behind the obfuscating emptiness of the dark center space. One 
then must struggle with the indecision as to whether the canvas hides an empty nothingness that 
remains absurd or suppresses a saturated fullness always on the interstices of manifestation. 
Consequently, the spectator of the painting must adjust to the vertiginous feelings of traversing 
the unstable edges that do and do not separate the colors; she must join the dance of the kinetic 
colors with its fluctuating movements of advance and retreat; and she must never tire of entering 
the painting’s space again and again always anticipating a new revelation of something, an 
incorrigible je ne sais pas, or, in other words, being consistently vulnerable to the surprise of the 
“for once, then something.”  
As Glenn Phillips contends, Rothko’s non-figural re-figuring of recondite dimensions of 
reality “tends to lead the viewer to scan and rescan the canvas in the attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting, asynchronous details with the simply-seeming composition.”30 John Cage certainly 
concurs with Phillips, insisting that Rothko intentionally creates “discordant [and] uneasy 
effects,”31 which, in turn, according to Robert Rosenblum, lead spectators to an experience with 
the Sublime as they allow themselves to be “absorbed into their radiant depths” through what 
passes as “an act of faith.” In other words, Rothko’s canvases succeed only as they preserve the 
constant tension between visual pertinence and impertinence, which constantly feeds the 
dynamic of emotional assimilation. Brian O’Doherty confirms this tension between knowledge 
and faith or pertinence and impertinence through his polar rubric “the tragic and the 
transcendental,” a rubric that concentrates on how Rothko manipulates the enigmatic by 
manipulating color and value and by playing with the tensions established by edges. He states 
that Rothko blurs his edges in order to establish a certain “environmental ambition and [an] 
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ambition of sentiment.”32 By diffusing the atmosphere surrounding the canvas, Rothko seeks to 
create an environment within which the spectator can “feel” the reality of the painting. Yet, this 
reality cannot be quantified or exhaustively identified; it always remains a “something else” 
because of the friction between the positive and the negative. O’Doherty declares that what 
Rothko’s “art contains or elicits is too positive to be a void [but] too negative to be a substance.” 
He postulates that it should be called a “mystery.”33 As a result, any attempt at a phenomenology 
of mystery predicated upon our consciousness of Rothko’s work will necessitate the paradoxical 
embrace of both the tragic and the transcendental.34  
Christopher Rothko concurs with much of what we conclude above about his father’s 
work. He certainly concedes that in attempting to figure the non-figural, his father succeeds in 
repeatedly establishing the reality of the enigmatic, offering only intimations of the Infinite, and 
creating transient emotional connections between himself and his viewers. In a beautiful 
summary of Rothko’s visually metaphorical paintings, Christopher interprets his father’s work as 
“[o]pen vistas of the intangible, forbidding because they seem to contain so little. Colors so 
immediate and yet evocative of the infinite. Deeply saturated surfaces that remain diaphanous 
and fragile.”35 “Diaphanous and fragile” – two characteristics that suggest Rothko strives to catch 
a glimpse of something that “encourages a quest for meaning, a larger understanding of our 
world, our lives, our purpose, our humanity,”36 a “something” that remains a riddle and 
relatively apophatic. Rothko’s art is, to be sure, fragile, but with a fragility akin to the ambiguity 
that always exists between signifier and signified, a diaphaneity that never loses the translucence 
of finitude, of making familiar what tenaciously resists full revelation.37 One may well extrapolate 
as applicable to all of Rothko’s classical paintings what his son claims about those in the Rothko 
Chapel: they “exist at the intersection of everything and nothing. They are silence and a full 
shout. They are concrete and yet hardly there […] In short, they live in the realm of the 
paradoxical, of the mutually exclusive.”38 
For Rothko, the above interpretations would simply explain his desire to “make the 
spectator see the world our way – not his way.”39 He firmly believes that he has discerned a new 
world and, of necessity, has invented a new visual language through which to communicate it 
and have it re-experienced by those who view his paintings.40 His classic non-figural paintings 
give “material existence to many unseen worlds and tempi.” They basically serve as expressions 
of an “anecdote of the spirit.”41 As such, according to several of his interpreters, including Jeffrey 
Weiss,42 Briony Fer,43 Bradford Collins,44 and Max Kozloff,45 Rothko’s classic works operate as 
metaphorical transformations of human experience in order to configure new modes of being-in-
the-world, perhaps even to configure non-figurally dimensions of transcendence and the sacred 
that can imaginatively re-figure human experience to the point that moral metamorphosis of 
character may ensue. As Rothko perennially remarked, if one does not investigate these 
implications of his art but myopically restricts one’s hermeneutic to the formalistic criteria of 
color, shape, and texture, then one has impeded the genuine communicative stimulus of his 
paintings. Such a misinterpretation of his canvases results in a failure to appropriate existentially 
his genuinely creative transfigurations of the facticity of life and his visual facilitation of a 
potential transcendence that intimates a mystery that invokes a certain faith.  
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Mimesis, Fiction, and Abstract Re-Figuration 
Julia Davis notes that, given the various theoretical influences on Rothko’s art and the 
over determination of ambiguity and affect found in his classical works, one may take several 
perspectives when seeking to interpret his philosophy of art. She contends that one can identify a 
Phenomenological Rothko, a Nietzschean Rothko, a Heideggerian Rothko, and a Medieval 
Mystical Rothko, among several others.46 I wish to augment her list of “Rothkos” and add the 
possibility of investigating a Ricœurean Rothko, specifically by exploring the applicability to 
Rothko’s art of Ricœur’s idea that poetics may achieve a split-reference regarding how reality 
discloses itself beyond the constraints of the literal. Ricœur, himself, allows for such an 
application when, in his rare passages on painting, he expounds upon the ontological dynamics 
at work in the visual arts, especially in connection with abstract art. Of course, as mentioned 
above, nowhere that I know of does Ricœur directly reference Mark Rothko; however, he does 
mention individual abstractionists, such as Kandinsky, Soulages, and Pollock.  
The latter two artists actually have rather direct connections with Rothko. Jackson 
Pollock joined Rothko as a member of the “Irascibles,” that New York school of Abstract 
Expressionists that also included Clyfford Still, Willem de Kooning, Ad Reinhardt, and Hans 
Hoffman.47 Additionally, both Pollock and Rothko were represented at one time by the Betty 
Parsons Gallery and were actively supported by the art connoisseur Peggy Guggenheim. The 
French abstractionist Pierre Soulages painted canvases most closely analogous to Rothko’s work, 
especially in his later outré noir period that is somewhat suggestive of Rothko’s later dark 
paintings, such as those in the Rothko Chapel. Indeed, Soulages actually befriended Rothko and 
once honored him with a studio party in Paris.48 Under the circumstances, therefore, when 
Ricœur expressly connects his conception of the ontologically disclosive power of mimesis to 
Soulages’s abstract style, I do not think it too much of a stretch to apply those same 
hermeneutical theories to interpreting Rothko’s preoccupation with reiterating and creating 
certain existential world structures through the medium of non-objective visual signifiers.  
Obviously, a fundamental question presents itself: what is it about abstract or non-figural 
art that attracts Ricœur and, by his own admission, relates so intrinsically well to his reflections 
on how discourse connects with reality? The simple answer to this question is that abstract art 
exemplifies and intensifies Ricœur’s extended hermeneutical consolidation of the tensive theory 
of metaphor, the transformative implications of the three-fold mimesis, the “paradox of fiction,” 
the schematizing dynamic of the productive imagination, and the supplementing of truth as 
adequation with truth as manifestation. Employing “metaphor” metaphorically, Ricœur contends 
that non-figural art betrays the multi-dimensionality of meaning that characterizes his theory of 
metaphor as the predicative assimilation of semantic impertinence.49 Metaphor does not address 
the cosmetic use of language as mere decoration but, instead, reveals that meaning can be 
discovered and invented through the tension of conflicting categories. Such impertinence 
provokes the imagination to maintain the tension between competing fields, while 
simultaneously deciphering new perspectives and insights into reality.50 The blurring of the 
edges among the various dimensions of meaning does not result in a blindness that fails to 
engage the world but actually establishes a “seeing-as” that stimulates ontological explorations 
that can genuinely transform individuals and situations. Ricœur considers these existential 
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experiments to be mimetic, not in the homogeneous sense of replicating a status quo ante, but in 
the metamorphic sense of re-configuring new ways of being-in-the-world.51 
For Ricœur, the mimetic motility inherent in the poetic process of shuttling between 
semantic pertinence and impertinence that characterizes the existential creativity of metaphor 
may also be noted in the resolution of the tension between temporal concordance and 
discordance that one discovers operative in the function of narrative in shaping new forms of 
being-in-the-world. Through the structuring of emplotment, narrative texts establish a certain 
logic that creates a coherence of relationship among the various episodes of life, among the 
multiplicity of actions and characters that determine historical reality, and between the flux of 
existence and the sense of an ending, something of a teleological “grasping together” of 
experience.52 In other words, narrative texts correlate the discordance of temporal existence 
through the concordance of a narrative logic, that is, a plot, which lends a structure or order to 
historical reality analogous to the semantic pertinence of metaphor that overcomes the apparent 
illogical impertinence of the metaphorical statement taken literally. In both cases, the imaginative 
creation of symmetry depends upon a mimetic process, mimetic not in the conventional sense of 
simple imitation but in the Aristotelian sense of a creative repetition, that is, imitation as 
innovation.53  
Ricœur actually delineates a threefold mimesis regarding how narrative, both fictional 
and historical, can creatively configure human experience. The “figurative” dynamic at work in 
the narrative logic of emplotment addresses all three ecstases of temporality – the past, the 
present, and the future. In the present, the metamorphic dynamic of configuration occurs through 
the innovative poetic process of what Ricœur calls mimesis2, a creative imitation that re-shapes 
existence imaginatively, in the schematizing sense of Kant’s productive imagination. In mimesis2, 
the imagination forges a second order reference to the lived experience of time. In doing so, it 
creates what Ricœur calls the “world of the text,” which generates, out of the prolific dynamism 
of semantic innovations, new models of and for comprehending human reality through the 
shaping of a concordant “synthesis of the heterogeneous.”54 The imitation of human action 
through narrative and various figures of speech, such as metaphor, generates the “world of the 
text” as a potentially new ontology, developing alternative interpretations of experience in order 
to formulate novel world structures or imaginative variations of reality. Indeed, mimesis2 is, 
therefore, a poetic attempt to con-figure human experience, to form together a new network or 
paradigm for giving meaning to human being by formulating an alternative Lebenswelt.  
Yet, since mimesis2 depends upon the imaginative momentum of innovation, it 
necessarily affiliates with tradition, which Ricœur claims manifests its own symmetry between 
innovation and sedimentation.55 But tradition equates with the past, which, in turn, concerns 
mimesis1, what Ricœur calls the pre-figuration of time through previously articulated symbols 
and structures. Human action can be innovatively configured and re-configured precisely 
because it has formerly been “symbolically mediated,” that is, preconfigured.56 In other words, 
mimesis1, as referencing past imaginative structures of the world, expresses Ricœur’s notion of 
thrownness, the idea that no discovery or invention of meaning occurs in vacuo, but always 
precipitates out of a reality previously interpreted and from antecedent texts already composed. 
All neoteric attempts at poetically configuring new interpretations of being-in-the-world, 
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therefore, erupt out of “a pre-understanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its 
symbolic resources, and its temporal character.”57  
The con-figurations of the pre-figurations of mimesis1 into new existential potentialities 
accomplished through mimesis2 awaits their ultimate fulfillment in the act of reading, whereby 
the narrative time of the text re-connects with existential time as the reader imaginatively engages 
the textual world and utilizes that world as a paradigm for transforming her/his lived time. 
Ricœur calls this intersection of the text with the reader’s experience “mimesis3” and associates it 
with Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutical application, that is, the practical alteration of human 
existence through the transfiguring implications of interpretation. In other words, mimesis3 
“marks the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader.”58 In doing 
so, Ricœur contends that the existential encounter with the text inherent in mimesis3 actualizes a 
“transcendence immanent in the text” that can directly affect the development of the reader’s 
experience of self and world. Mimesis3, consequently, names the revelatory and transformative 
competency of narrativity that can evoke both a present realization of clarity in comprehending a 
transfigured reality and also a future hope and expectation for a persistent transformation of 
experience that could be considered as religiously redemptive.59 In addition, since the productive 
imagination impels this mimetic process, Ricœur considers this redemption to be the renovating 
efficacy of “the grace of imagination.”60 
Of course, Ricœur’s reflections on metaphor and the mimetic process remain distinctively 
affiliated with linguistic philosophy, but that affiliation should not preempt us from engaging in 
intersemiotic translation and “reading” Rothko’s canvases from a Ricœurean perspective. Such a 
“reading” certainly appears valid given Ricœur’s explicit claim that a work of art may have a 
semiotic density akin to the multi-dimensionality of metaphor. He goes so far as to admit that a 
work of art may well establish an opportunity “for discovering aspects of language that are 
ordinarily concealed by its usual practice.”61 In point of fact, he unequivocally connects his ideas 
of mimesis to the semiotic and “semantic” potentialities within painting, specifically abstract 
painting. Precisely because abstract art is not representational or literally figurative, it functions 
as a purer form of mimesis by disclosing dimensions of experience that could not otherwise be 
expressed – the creative imitation of that which has, heretofore, been hidden.62 This mimetic and 
metaphoric dynamic of plastic art conspicuously illustrates what Ricœur terms “the twofold 
nature of the sign: retreat from and transfer back into the world.”63 This semiotic peristalsis 
between the sign’s expansion away from reality and its contraction back into the world achieves a 
unique “biting power” in abstract art, since the expansion away from objectivity energizes an 
even stronger contraction back into the experience of the spectator in order to re-figure or trans-
figure reality in a revelatory and redemptive manner. By distancing itself from common 
empirical references, abstract painting empowers a new referentiality predicated upon an intra-
semiosis that produces an “infinite availability for incongruous associations.”64 Yet, this 
incongruity grounds the existential possibility of a transfigured being-in-the-world.  
In his provocative, albeit brief, article entitled “Paul Ricœur’s Hermeneutics of Painting,” 
Mario Valdés certainly accepts the intersemiotic translation of Ricœur’s theories of metaphor and 
narrative into the visual vocabulary of color, form, and texture that communicates through 
abstract art. In particular, he accentuates the intimacy in Ricœur between the polysemy of 
linguistic meanings and the strategies of the mimetic process of pre-, con-, and re-figuration 
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manifested through the media of canvas and color. Valdés insists that the artist and the spectator 
share a pre-figured world (mimesis1), which then finds itself re-interpreted and re-conceptualized 
through the specific creative work of the artist (mimesis2).65 As a result, the spectator must 
contend with the work’s plasticity, with what Ricœur would call its capacity “to restructure the 
world […] [by] unsettling, challenging, remodeling the [spectator’s] expectations.”66 Valdés 
declares that the work’s re-structuring capacity mediates something from the experience of the 
artist to something of the experience of the spectator. Specifically, the work mediates meaning 
between the artist and the viewer, a meaning that can be communicated to a certain extent but 
that resists genuine translation between the two existences. What the artist embodies in the work 
and what the perceiver interprets can never be homogeneous and can never be totalized. The 
work establishes a certain chain reaction, therefore, in which one metaphor leads to another, one 
interpretation suggests a second, and the spectator finds it impossible to escape a functionally 
infinite series of potential experiences whereby both the self and the world of the self remain 
open to the incarnation of a plurality of meanings (mimesis3).67 Indeed, Valdés goes so far as to 
characterize Ricœur’s aesthetic connection between artist and observer as analogous to a 
“religious vision.”68 
For Ricœur, the over-determination of the symbolic efficacy of painting explicitly 
augments the referential possibilities of the ontological intimations inherent in the work. The 
painting brackets the literal reality of empirical forms in order to advance the lateral reality of 
new cognitive and affective moments of existential import. The work instigates imaginative 
variations of both the ego and the environment. It accomplishes this through what Ricœur terms 
“iconic augmentation,” a phrase he borrows from François Dagognet that allows him to 
transplant his perspectives on poetic discourse over into the visual arts.69 Image can now be both 
discursive and visual, which indicates that painting can act metaphorically, mimetically, and 
referentially to reconstruct reality in new and imaginative ways. Ricœur insists that abstract art 
may accomplish this uniquely and more emphatically because it distances itself from 
representation of the empirical and seeks to embody, through color, form, and texture, aspects of 
existence that always remain non-figural. The function of abstract art, therefore, “is not to help us 
to recognize objects but to discover dimensions of experience that did not exist prior to the 
work.”70 In other words, abstract paintings reinforce the paradox of fiction, whereby the very fact 
that a certain “unreality” has been established enjoins the creative re-configurations of reality 
inspired by the artist. 
Ricœur consolidates the paradox of fiction with the “paradox of iconic augmentation,” by 
which he denotes the dynamic whereby the imagination more closely approaches the “heart of 
the reality which is no longer the world of manipulatable objects, but the world into which we 
have been thrown by birth and within which we try to orient ourselves by projecting our 
innermost possibilities upon it […].”71 This is the world within which we “dwell,” a world that 
depends upon our productively imaginative aptitude to “see-as,” to augment and remake reality 
poetically. Yet, he insists that this poetic refiguring of reality occurs only as the imagination 
deviates from what ordinary language or first-order reference calls “reality.” This deviation 
comes to a unique expression in the very act of abstraction; that is, because abstract art such as 
Rothko’s conspicuously distances itself from mundane imagery, it is capable of successfully 
engaging in imaginative variations of the world and of reinterpreting human existence. 
B. Keith Putt 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 7, No 2 (2016)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2016.353    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu   
105 
 
Conclusion  
Ricœur clearly includes in the imaginative variations of abstract art the power to incite 
new architectures of meaning as well as new affective responses to those meanings. He claims 
that art not only communicates new models for understanding the self and the world but also the 
appropriate moods necessary in order to engage those new re-configurations of reality. Through 
the singularity of the work, the artist may communicate universal feelings that connect the 
humanity of spectator to that of the artist or that actually create new sensitivities to re-imagined 
structures of existence. Yet, such emphases on moods, worlds, communication, transformation, 
imagination, and referentiality directly tie Ricœur’s philosophy to Rothko’s aesthetic theory and 
to his classical works of abstraction. Both insist that non-figural art can place factual reality in an 
epoché that then supplies the emotional and cognitive space within which the spectator can 
“dwell” and endeavor to experience moods and insights that can eventually remodel factual 
reality into new and significant horizons of being. For example, one can easily correlate Rothko’s 
stated purpose for creating large canvases as a means whereby the spectator becomes enveloped 
in the visceral dynamics of the painting with Ricœur’s contention that abstract art can manifest a 
world that assimilates the spectator into “a trail of fire issuing from itself, reaching [us] and 
reaching beyond [us] to the universality of humanity.”72  
I believe that Rothko and Ricœur agree that abstract art can communicate, renovate, and 
appropriate both new feelings and new realities. Such art reveals a truth function of a second-
order that deepens both the mystery and the wonder of existence. Neither would accept that art 
is merely decorative or auto-telic. Instead, art blurs the edges among the various interpretations 
of potential meaning and, in doing so, sharpens the contrast inherent in polysemy. That, in turn, 
results in clarifying the redemptive implications of imaginative redescriptions of the world, 
redescriptions that ensue from the grace of the imagination. Such refigurations of existence 
cannot, however, avoid revealing that lacunae remain, that one persistently confronts fissures in 
existence that can never be filled either intellectually or artistically. Both Rothko and Ricœur 
confess the constancy of secrets, those ambiguities of existence that do not arise because of the 
over-determination of polysemy but because of systemic enigmas that never allow full disclosure. 
Consequently, both certify that the non-figural resists re-figuration through poetic language or 
through artistic forms or through intellectual commentary that attempts to figure them out. 
Rothko and Ricœur, therefore, would consent to Wallace Stevens’ poetic critique of rationalists 
for wearing square hats, thinking in square rooms, and confining themselves to “right-angled 
triangles.”73 That is just too much linearity, too many hard edges that claim to define and confine 
interpretations of reality within nice and neat categories. Human being-in-the-world is not so 
distinctly delineated for Rothko and Ricœur, who testify that the edges remain blurred and 
indistinct at points, signaling that, in the midst of a profusion of conceptual and poetic languages 
or an abundance of artistic media, something always remains apophatic and aniconic. In other 
words, the non-figural may only be re-figured through metaphorical discourse or abstract design 
that leaves something unsaid and something unexpressed. 
Through the second naiveté of poetic discourse and the plastic intensifications of abstract 
canvases, one may discover re-descriptions of what transcends description, come to appreciate 
the intentionality of a consciousness that never fixates on a thing-in-itself or deludes itself into 
believing that it has attained Cartesian certainty regarding the final meaning of existence. Rothko 
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and Ricœur do not deny that there is something meaningful, or, at least, potentially meaningful, 
something true or, at least, potentially true. They simply concede that one can never know exactly 
what that something is. But for once, then, something; and again, for once, then, something; and 
again, and again, in an ongoing iteration of the tension between what can be said and shown but 
remains silent and hidden – a tension that never sharply focuses the blurring of the edges.74  
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